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Abstract: In this article, I present the trinitarian teaching of the first seven 
ecumenical councils, what we might call Conciliar Trinitarianism. I then 
consider two questions. First, what is the relationship between the divine 
persons and the divine nature? I argue that neither strict identity nor 
instantiation interpretations of that relationship fit well with the conciliar 
texts. Second, does the relation of procession among the divine persons, 
asserted in the conciliar texts, imply an objectionable ontological 
subordination in the Trinity? I argue that there is at least one way for a 
proponent of Conciliar Trinitarianism to deny that objectionable ontological 
subordination follows from the divine processions. 
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The recent shift of focus in Theology, especially Analytic Theology, to theorizing 
with explicit reference to the teachings of the ecumenical councils is a welcome and 
important change. The editors of this special edition have done a good work in 
focusing on the trinitarian theology of the ecumenical councils. In this article, I 
present the trinitarian teaching of the first seven ecumenical councils, what we might 
call Conciliar Trinitarianism. Since this marks (I hope) the start of a research program 
in Analytic Theology, after explicating Conciliar Trinitarianism, I use the remainder 
of this article to do two things. First, I commend areas in Conciliar Trinitarianism 
that require more work. Second, I note objections to Conciliar Trinitarianism that 
need to be met. There is overlap in these two projects. I focus on two questions. First, 
what is the relationship between the divine persons and the divine nature? Second, 
does the relation of procession among the divine persons, asserted in the conciliar 
texts, imply an objectionable ontological subordination in the Trinity? 
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2. What the councils teach about the Trinity 
 
There are many questions that one might have about the conciliar doctrine of the 
Trinity. I will focus on the following six questions. What are there three of? What is 
there one of? What are the relations between the three? What are the relations 
between the three and the one? What are the attributes of the one? What are the 
attributes of the three? The councils give answers to all these questions except the 
fourth, concerning the relations between the three and the one. I go on to discuss 
potential answers to that question in Section 3.  
Concerning the first two questions—what is there one of?; what are there three 
of?—the councils claim that there is one nature or substance, and that there are three 
persons or hypostases. To see this, consider a portion of a synodical letter from 
bishops gathered in Constantinople in the year 382. Sadly, we have no copy of the 
tome or anathemas from 1st Constantinople, the second ecumenical council. But we 
do have the above–mentioned letter, which explicates the findings of that council.1 
The gathered Fathers there write of the Creed of Nicaea that 
 
It tells us how to believe in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the holy 
Spirit: believing also, of course, that the Father, the Son and the holy Spirit have a 
single Godhead and power and substance, a dignity deserving the same honour and 
a co–eternal sovereignty, in three most perfect hypostases, or three perfect persons 
(Tanner 1990, 28).  
 
We see both questions answered here.  
First, we see that there is one “Godhead,” “power,” and “substance.” Shortly 
thereafter in the text, one finds the same safeguarded negatively, when the bishops 
condemn the view that there is a “division of substance or of nature or of Godhead” 
in the persons (Tanner 1990, 28).  
Second, we see a distinction between three perfect persons, or hypostases. Again, 
the same answer is safeguarded negatively shortly thereafter, as the above text 
continues that the hypostases are not confused, and their proper characteristics are 
not destroyed. This is meant to fight the views of Sabellius and others, who took the 
distinctions to be merely mental, not real.  
We find the same two answers to these questions taught negatively by way of 
anathema later at the Second Council of Constantinople, which says, in Anathema 
1:  
 
1 For a brief discussion of the history and texts, see Tanner (1990, 21).   
CONCILIAR TRINITARIANISM 
 3 
If anyone will not confess that the Father, Son and holy Spirit have one nature or 
substance, that they have one power and authority, that there is a consubstantial 
Trinity, one Deity to be adored in three subsistences or persons: let him be anathema. 
(Tanner 1990, 114)2 
 
In brief, according to the councils, the thing that is one can be referred to as the divine 
nature, the Godhead, and the divine substance. Elsewhere the Latin translation of 
Cyril’s letters refers to the same one thing as the divine essentia (Tanner 1990, 50, 73). 
And it is frequently referred to as the divinity (divinitas) as well (Tanner 1990, 40, 
80). The things that are three can be referred to as the three divine persons, 
hypostases, and subsistences.3 
Consider the next question, concerning the relations between the three divine 
persons. As later authors will put it, the distinction between the persons is a real 
distinction, not a distinction of reason. The proper characteristic of the Father is the 
Father’s alone, not the Son’s or the Spirit’s, not merely in language, but in reality. As 
Cyril says in his Third Letter to Nestorius, accepted at the Council of Ephesus in 431, 
“the Spirit exists in his own hypostasis and is thought of on his own, as being Spirit 
and not as Son, even so he is not alien to the Son” (Tanner 1990, 57). The Spirit really 
is not the Son. What is the proper characteristic of each person, the characteristic that 
differentiates them one from another, according to the councils?  
Cyril says in the same letter, in the very next sentence, that  
 
the Spirit was poured forth4 by the Son, as indeed the Son was poured forth from 
the God and Father. (Tanner 1990, 57) 
 
Likewise, the Spirit is said to proceed from the Father as well in the exposition of 
faith from 1st Constantinople (Tanner 1990, 24) and in Cyril’s letter to John of Antioch 
 
2 Here as elsewhere in the Tanner translation, the same Greek, hypostasis, is translated into English 
sometimes as “subsistence” and sometimes merely transliterated as “hypostasis” (see for instance 
Tanner 1990, 116).   
3 Here and following, I will include footnotes to De fide propositions from Ludwig Ott’s The 
Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma.  I do this, not as evidence that the claims are true, but rather as 
evidence that my interpretation of the councils is not a novelty.  Ott’s claiming that something is De 
fide does not show that it is part of Conciliar Trinitarianism, of course, since Ott is Catholic, and so 
has more sources for De fide propositions than the first seven councils.  Ott (1960, 52) writes, “In God 
there are Three Persons, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. Each of the Three Persons possesses 
the one (numerical) Divine Essence. (De fide.).”  
4 The Greek here is procheitai; the Latin is procedit.   
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about peace (again accepted as a text from Ephesus; Tanner 1990, 73).5 The divine 
persons, then, are related to one another such that the Son proceeds from the Father, 
the Father proceeds from none, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father in a way 
that, in some manner, includes the Son.6 The Son’s mode of procession is called 
begetting in the councils; the Spirit’s mode is called spiration at later, western councils 
that are judged to be ecumenical by the Catholic Church.7 Spiration is further 
subdivided between active and passive spiration, where active spiration is to 
begetting as passive spiration is to being begotten. We see here an answer to the 
questions concerning the relations between the persons: the Father is neither 
begotten nor (passively) spirated; the Son is begotten but not (passively) spirated; 
the Spirit is not begotten but is (passively) spirated.8 They are really distinct from 
one another, each having proper characteristics that separate one from the others.9  
Having provided the answers to the first three questions about what is three and 
what is one, and the interrelations among the three, we do well now to ask about the 
attributes of the one nature (substance, Godhead, essence, divinity) and the 
attributes of the three persons (hypostases, subsistences). I will begin with the 
attributes of the divine nature according to the councils.10 
The divine nature, according to the councils, is impassible, immutable, 
unspeakable, and not diminished by the incarnation.11 For just a few examples from 
many that one might cite, the Fathers at Chalcedon write that it is a novel heresy to 
suppose that “the divine nature of the Only–begotten is passible” (Tanner 1990, 84).12 
They go on to claim that the council “expels from the assembly of the priests those 
who dare to say that the divinity of the Only–begotten is passible” (Tanner 1990, 85–
6). Finally, Leo calls the divine nature “invulnerable” (Tanner 1990, 78). Concerning 
immutability, Cyril writes, in a letter accepted at the council of Ephesus, “those are 
quite mad who suppose that ‘a shadow of change’ is conceivable in connexion with 
 
5 Here the Latin is the same, procedentem (1st Constantinople) and procedit (Ephesus), but the Greek 
is erchomenon and ekporeuetai.  The procession language is scriptural as well; see John 15:26.  I thank 
Jonathan Rutledge for help with the Greek text.   
6 I am not here making a case for the Filioque in the early councils.     
7 See, for instance, 2nd Lyons, Constitution II and Florence, Session 6 (July 6th, 1439) (Tanner 1990, 
314, 526 respectively). 
8 I leave to the side all discussion of who actively spirates so as not to take a stand on the Filioque.  
9 Ott (1960, 61) writes, “In God there are two Internal Divine Processions. (De fide).”  He goes on 
to identify those processions as begetting and spirating. 
10 For a more detailed discussion of these attributes and the conciliar texts supporting these 
ascriptions, see Pawl (2016d, 16–18, 179–90; 2019b, 16–19). 
11 This list is merely representative, not exhaustive.  
12 For other examples, see Tanner (1990, 5, 51, 53, 72–3). 
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the divine nature of the Word” (Tanner 1990, 72). Cyril’s letter to John of Antioch 
about peace calls the Godhead “unspeakable” (Tanner 1990, 73). Finally, the divine 
nature loses nothing in the incarnation. As Leo says of the incarnation, “each nature 
kept its proper character without loss” (Tanner 1990, 78).  
Concerning the final question of the attributes of the persons, we have seen a 
partial answer to that question in the discussion of the interrelations between the 
divine persons. Each person has a unique proper characteristic. Moreover, the creeds 
include many affirmations about some persons that they do not likewise predicate 
to the others. For instance, only the Son is said to be born of a woman, and it is only 
the Holy Spirit that is said to speak through the prophets. Likewise, some later 
anathemas predicate different attributes of the divine persons. For instance, consider 
this text from an anathema from Second Constantinople:  
 
“There is only one God and Father, from whom all things come, and one Lord, Jesus 
Christ, through whom all things are, and one holy Spirit, in whom all things are.” 
(Tanner 1990, 114) 
 
What about attributes that are shared among the persons? Concerning shared 
attributes, they are co–eternal (Tanner 1990, 28, 42, 58, 77, 80), worthy of the same 
worship (Tanner 1990, 24), of equal glory (Tanner 1990, 24, 79), of equal honor 
(Tanner 1990, 28), and of equal power (Tanner 1990, 57, 77, 114).13 Other non–
ecumenical but important early councils speak to this issue as well. For instance, the 
Tome of Damascus from the Council of Rome in 382 says: 
 
Anyone who denies that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have one Godhead, 
one might, one majesty, one power, one glory, one Lordship, one kingdom, one will 
and truth, is a heretic. (Dupuis 2001, para. 306/20) 
 
The same council affirms that the Father, Son, and Spirit each “can do all things, 
knows all things and is everywhere present” (Dupuis 2001, paras. 306/12, 306/17). It 
also affirms that all three are “equal, living eternally, containing all things visible 
and invisible, all–powerful, judging, creating and saving all things” (Dupuis 2001, 
para. 306/21). 
At this point, I’ve answered five of the six questions with which I started. What is 
there one of? Nature, substance, divinity, essence, Godhead. What are there three 
of? Persons, hypostases, subsistences. How are these three persons related to one 
 




another? They are really distinct and related by procession. What are the attributes 
of the divine nature? It is impassible, immutable, unspeakable, and undiminished 
by the Son’s incarnation. What are the attributes of the persons? They are alike in 
eternality, worshipfulness, glory, honor, and power. They are unalike in procession 
and in some assertions from the Creeds and anathemas. In particular, they are 
unalike in incarnational predicates (e.g., only the Son was born of Mary). But what 
of the sixth question: the relation between each person and the divine nature? I do 
not see that question answered in the councils.  
In what follows, I will discuss two questions, the first of which concerns the 
relation between the persons and the nature—we might call this the Person–Nature 
question. The second takes up an objection to the consistency of the content of 
Conciliar Trinitarianism.  
 
3. What is the Relation between the Divine Persons and the Divine Nature? 
 
As noted above, I am unaware of any text in the first seven ecumenical councils that 
determines one unique understanding of the relation between each divine person 
and the divine nature. That said, there are some contenders for that relation which 
have some initial support yet are inconsistent with Conciliar Trinitarianism. I will 
focus on two common relations considered in the literature: strict identity and 
instantiation. Much of this discussion will be familiar to those who know the 
literature on so–called Latin and Social models of the Trinity.14 What novelty there 
is in this section will be in relating the argumentation to the teachings of Conciliar 
Trinitarianism and in the second objection to the instantiation view. To reiterate, my 
goal in each of the two following subsections is to show that two answers to the 
Person–Nature question, even though they have some initial support, are 





14 A nearby question to the one discussed in this section is the question of what the “is” in “the 
Father is God,” or “the Son is God,” or “the Holy Spirit is God” means. There has been much 
discussion of this topic.  For recent examples, see Baber (2002; 2008; 2015; 2016; 2019), Bohn (2011), 
Cain (2016), Davidson (2016), Fisher (2016), Grant and Spencer (2015), Hasker (2009; 2013; 2016; 2017a; 
2017b; 2018; 2019), Jedwab (2015), Jedwab and Keller (forthcoming), Leftow (1999; 2009; 2010; 2012; 
2018), Long (2019), McCall (2014), Molto (2017), Mooney (2018), Mullins (2017), Owen and Dunne 
(2019), Page (2017), Paoletti (2019), Pickup (2016), Spencer (2017), Swinburne (2018), Thom (2012), 
Tuggy (2013), White (2016a; 2016b), Williams (2013; 2017). 
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3.1. Strict Identity 
 
When philosophers speak of identity, they often mean what I will call strict identity. 
Strict identity is reflexive (everything is identical to itself), it is symmetric (if a=b, 
then b=a), and it is transitive (if a=b and b=c, then a=c). Moreover, it obeys Leibniz’s 
Law: if a=b, then anything true of a is true of b, and vice versa.15 The view under 
consideration here is the view that each divine person is strictly identical with the 
divine nature.16  
There is some reason to think that the relationship between the persons and the 
nature should be understood as strict identity. For one reason, which we will see 
more fully developed in the discussion of instantiation below, if the relation weren’t 
strict identity, it would be hard to see how monotheism is true. For another reason, 
as we will see in the paragraphs that follow, we find language in the translations of 
the councils and in scholarly and historical works on the Trinity that describe the 
relationship between the persons and the nature using the language of “identity,” 
or “sameness,” or an emphatic “is.”17 Finally, as Brian Leftow writes (using 
“absolute” to mean what I mean by “strict”) in his presentation of the logical 
problem of the trinity,  
 
Here and elsewhere, ‘identity’ expresses absolute identity. This first section only sets 
up a problem many have considered. If the identity reading of ‘is’ here and in similar 
contexts were not at least plausible, no one would have thought there was a problem 
to think about. (Leftow 2018, 375) 
 
I agree with Leftow—if we didn’t begin with at least a presumption of strict identity, 
then we wouldn’t have been worried about there being three distint persons, each 
of which “is,” in some sense, God.  
Reflection on what the tradition has said about the relation between the divine 
nature and the divine persons shows that we ought not to answer the question of 
the relation between the nature and persons by appeal to strict identity. We can 
 
15 Sometimes the Law is stated in terms of “properties” rather than things true of.  That way of 
stating it builds more ontology into it than is necessary to present the Law.  We don’t need to quantify 
over properties – or, at least it is a contested point – in order to understand that if Joseph and Dr. 
Jedwab are identical, then if it is true that Joseph casts a shadow, then so does Dr. Jedwab.  No need 
to posit the property of casting a shadow here to use Leibniz’s Law.   
16 In this section I am assuming a standard semantics of names and analysis of definite descriptions 
that also involve strict identity.  For a different take, see Rea and Brower (2005, 70). 
17 For instance, Ludwig Ott (1960, 68) writes: “The Relations in God are really identical with the 
Divine Nature (De fide).”   
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show both that the traditional understanding of identity in question is not strict 
identity and show the contradictions inherent in viewing the relation as strict 
identity by focusing on a later conciliar pronouncement. 
The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) is reckoned an ecumenical council by the 
Catholic Church but is not one of the first seven ecumenical councils, and so its 
documents do not count as part of Conciliar Trinitarianism, as defined here. That 
said, it is an important work in the western church prior to the Protestant 
Reformation. In it, we find one of the most detailed discussions of the Trinity from 
later councils. This discussion, entitled “on the Error of Abbot Joachim,” vindicates 
the trinitarian teaching of Peter Lombard against the charges of heresy which 
Joachim leveled against it. At this medieval council, the Church Fathers wrote: 
 
There exists a certain supreme reality [summa res], incomprehensible and ineffable, 
which truly is the Father and the Son and the holy Spirit, the three persons together 
and each one of them separately. Therefore in God there is only a Trinity, not a 
quaternary, since each of the three persons is that reality—that is to say substance, 
essence or divine nature—which alone is the principle of all things, besides which 
no other principle can be found… Although therefore the Father is one person, the 
Son another person and the holy Spirit another person, they are not different 
realities, but rather that which is the Father is the Son and the holy Spirit, altogether 
the same. (Tanner 1990, 232) 
 
The content omitted in the ellipsis is an important two sentences to which I will 
return. But now, notice the sameness language of the passage. The nature truly is 
each person; each person is that reality; they are not different realities; that which is 
the Father is the Son, altogether the same. Emphatic affirmations like this lead some 
people to take the claims to be strict identity claims.  
That said, they cannot be strict identity claims. And, in fact, the omitted two 
sentences show us why. They read:  
 
This reality neither begets nor is begotten nor proceeds; the Father begets, the Son 
is begotten and the holy Spirit proceeds. Thus there is a distinction of persons but a 
unity of nature. (Tanner 1990, 232) 
 
If the relation that the Fathers were after in talking about the persons truly being the 
nature, or being altogether the same as the nature, and so on, were the relation of 
strict identity, then Leibniz’s Law would hold among the things so related. But 
Leibniz’s Law does not hold between them. For that reality, which really is the 
Father, which is altogether the same as the Father, does not beget. And the Father 
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does beget.18 The same is true for the proper processional characteristics of the other 
two divine persons. Thus, strict identity was not the relation the later, Western 
church had in mind.  
Moving back to the texts of Conciliar Trinitarianism, we see that the strict identity 
of each person with the nature is something inconsistent with Conciliar 
Trinitarianism. Christ suffered, but the divine nature cannot suffer. Again, the 
divine persons and the divine nature do not have the same attributes, and so, by 
Leibniz’s Law, they are not identical in the strict sense of identity. 
A second problem is commonly raised for theories of the Trinity that employ strict 
identity as the relation between each divine person and the divine nature. Suppose 
again, for argument, that the Father is strictly identical to the divine nature, and that 
the Son is strictly identical to the divine nature. Using symmetry, we can derive from 
“the Son is strictly identical to the divine nature” that the divine nature is identical 
to the Son. By transitivity, then, we can derive that, since the Father is identical to 
the divine nature and the divine nature is identical to the Son, the Father is identical 
to the Son, identical in the strict sense. But this is contrary to the conciliar teaching, 
as we’ve seen. There are three different persons (hypostases) who have their own 
proper attributes and are not confused.  
The traditional way this second objection is put is as follows: Any two things 
identical with a third are identical with one another. The Father and Son are each 
identical to a third thing: the divine nature. So, the Father and Son are identical with 
one another. We might summarize the moral here as follows: if the conciliar Fathers 
meant that each person is strictly identical to the divine nature, then, on Conciliar 
Trinitarianism, the Father is strictly identical to the Son. But he isn’t. And they didn’t 
think he was. So, this is a bad interpretation of their view.  
A third sort of argument combines both the preceding arguments. It begins by 
showing, through transitivity and symmetry, that one divine person is strictly 
identical with another. It then applies the predicates apt of one, via Leibniz’s Law, 
to the other. In this manner we can derive, supposing again that the persons are each 
strictly identical with the divine nature, that the Father is begotten, that the Holy 
Spirit suffers on the Cross, etc. Such claims, though, are inconsistent with the 
teaching of the first seven ecumenical councils. Conciliar Trinitiarianism is 
inconsistent with the “strict identity” answer to the Person–Nature question. 
Some might object here that, instead of tinkering with the councils and “real 
identity,” we ought instead to tinker with how we understand strict identity. I agree 
 
18 Ott (1960, 61) writes: “The Divine Persons, not the Divine Nature, are the subject of the Internal 




in a sense: I don’t want to tinker with the councils. That said, I’m writing for a 
contemporary analytic audience, and those folks have a very clear idea of what 
“strict identity” is, and a nebulous idea at best of what real identity is, if it doesn’t 
mean strict identity. My intent here isn’t to change what the councils said; it is to get 
clear on which views are consistent with what they said. One view that is not 
consistent with what they said, in my estimation, based on these three preceding 
arguments, is that the persons are identical with the Divine nature in the strict sense 
I stipulated above. 
Another might object that I have a faulty hermeneutic here. I’m employing 
something like a principle of charity in a situation where it is unwarranted. Perhaps 
they were all just severely confused or lacked logical proficiency, and so were 
incapable of seeing the problem. Or perhaps they could see the problems with such 
claims but were slavishly tied to traditional language, affirming a contradiction 
anyway. Or perhaps they saw the problems but affirmed the strict identity claims 
for savvy political reasons. Or perhaps there was a mixture of motivations, with 
some being stupid, some slavish, some savvy, and perhaps some unfortunate souls 
being all three.  
I have no doubt that some bishops fit each of those three groups. But I see little 
reason to think that some bishops fitting into such groups forces upon us an 
interpretation of the councils such that strict identity is the relation between the 
nature and the persons of the Trinity.  
Concerning slavish acceptance of the teaching, contradictions be damned, 
perhaps such people were there. But we know from both conciliar and extra–
conciliar works by these thinkers that their heresy hunting was most often done in 
the form of Modus Tollens: 
 
If Nestorius’s view of Mary as Christ–bearer but not God–bearer is orthodox, then 
the person who is borne by Mary is not a divine person. But the person borne by 
Mary is a divine person. And so Nestorius’s view is heretical.  
 
Such careful searching for contradictions goes both ways in the debates, as the letters 
from Cyril and Nestorius included in the Council of Ephesus make clear. Nestorius 
did not argue in his replies that his view is contradictory, but that’s okay. We can be 
confident, based on their writings, how the Fathers would have responded to such 
a move (i.e., not favorably).  
Concerning political motivations, they were ample. Some important theologians 
of this era played the game well (e.g., Cyril of Alexandria), while others played it 
CONCILIAR TRINITARIANISM 
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poorly (e.g., John Chrysostom19). That said, I know of no good evidence for thinking 
that doctrinally affirming that the divine nature is related to each distinct divine person by 
strict identity was a matter of political intrigue. And even if it were, that wouldn’t 
give us any reason to think that the councils must be interpreted as requiring strict 
identity as the relation in question.  
Thus, while all three of these features may well have been present among the 
bishops at the councils, there is little reason to think that the presence of these 
features lends any support to the thesis that, according to Conciliar Trinitarianism, 
the relation between the divine nature and the divine persons is one of strict identity. 
Such an answer to the Person–Nature question isn’t found in the texts. I have 
provided three reasons in this section for thinking that such an answer is not only 




Consider, then, the second common interpretation of the relation between the divine 
nature and each divine person: instantiation. Instantiation is the relation that holds 
between something universal and a particular that has or exemplifies that universal. 
There’s the Platonic form of courage (say), and then there’s the war hero who is 
courageous. The relation that holds between the hero and that universal is called 
instantiation. On the view under consideration here, the relationship that holds 
between the divine nature and each divine person is instantiation; each of the three 
divine persons instantiates the divine nature.  
There are some reasons for thinking that instantiation is the right way to 
understand the relation between the divine nature and the divine persons. For one 
thing, natures are typically viewed as abstract entities which one could have. 
Humanity, for instance, is often viewed as a thing in which you and I share. The 
term translated “divine nature” or “Godhead” (theotētos) is an abstract noun, much 
like humanity. It stands to reason, some argue, that there is one universal of divinity 
instantiated by each of the three different divine persons.  
Consider another reason that might militate in favor of the instantiation answer 
to the question of the relation between the divine persons and the divine nature. 
Were the nature an abstract nature, it would make sense why it couldn’t be causally 
affected, changed, or diminished in an incarnation. Forms like Courage or Humanity 
can’t be changed or affected, even if individual courageous humans can be. In that 
 
19 What do you think would happen to you if you were to liken Empress Eudoxia to both Jezebel 
and Herodias in your orations (Davis 1990, 137–38)? 
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sense, the instantiation view of the nature fits well with the features predicated of 
the divine nature in the first seven councils.  
On the other hand, there are at least two problems that this instantiation view has 
to face as an answer to the Person–Nature question, both having to do with the 
conciliar claim that there is only one God. First, consider a problem often raised 
against Social Trinitarianism, a type of instantiation view that builds into the unity 
of God much more than mere instantiation. The problem goes as follows. The 
instantiation view gives up monotheism. When we count human people, we count 
by individual instances of humanity. When my daughters, Mary, Beatrice, Edith, 
and Agnes, each instantiate the universal, Humanity, and each has proper 
characteristics such that we don’t confuse them, what we have there are four 
humans, not a single human.20 So likewise, on the instantiation account, we ought to 
invert the line from the Athanasian creed, saying instead that there is not one God 
but three gods.21  
Second, a problem with the conciliar and traditional focus on monotheism. Even 
aside from the claim that the instantiation view leads to polytheism, one can ask 
what the Christian emphasis on monotheism comes down to on this instantiation 
view. If this were the theory of the church Fathers, the view they adamantly asserted 
when saying that God is one, what were they meaning to say? They weren’t meaning 
to say, on this view, that there’s only one thing that instantiates the universal, 
Divinity. For, on this view, they meant that there are three things that instantiate 
that universal—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—in contrast to the quotation 
from Lateran IV above, which claims that there is one supreme thing that is the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. So, what’s the relevant one thing on this view? True, the 
Father is one thing, the Son one thing, the Spirit one thing, etc. But none of these 
three, on this instantiation view, is strictly identical with the thing that is the 
important one thing according to the ecumenical councils.  
As we saw earlier from the councils, the relevant one thing is the nature, Godhead, 
or substance. And that thing, that nature, Godhead, or substance, is a universal on 
the instantiation view. So, the emphasis on monotheism turns out to be an emphasis 
on the number of universals of Divinity there are.  
Why care strongly about the number of universals of Divinity there are? Consider 
a bloated ontology on which there are two universals for each kind term. To be 
human, for instance, one instantiates both Humanity1 and Humanity2. And so on 
 
20 This example is purely hypothetical insofar as it requires me to say that I do not confuse my 
four daughters.   




for other kinds. In such a case, there are two universals of divinity, Divinity1 and 
Divinity2, and anything divine instantiates both. Is that the view that they were 
trying to prohibit? Again, why would they care about that? The religion of the 
metaphysician might include grave warnings against multiplying entities beyond 
necessity. But Christian bishops wouldn’t view this question of subtle metaphysics 
as a hill to die on. 
Think about it another way. Christians wanted to safeguard the monotheism they 
inherited from Judaism (whether they succeeded is a separate question). Now, 
suppose a Jewish man were accused of polytheism. Here’s a defense he could give 
on this instantiation view of the divine nature. He could say, 
 
Yes, it is true; I worship the God of Israel, Baal of the Canaanites, Dagon of the 
Philistines, and countless others. But fear not! I only countenance a single universal, 
Divinity, which each of my many gods instantiates. As such, I’m still a monotheist.  
 
I don’t think Moses would be impressed. He’d probably throw some tablets. If we 
must speak in terms of instantiating a universal of Divinity, the Jewish emphasis on 
monotheism was not the claim that there is only one divinity universal. If we must 
speak in terms of instantiating a universal of divinity, the Jewish emphasis on 
monotheism was the claim that there is but one thing that instantiates that universal. 
That, though, is a claim not open to the person who interprets the conciliar texts in 
this instantiation manner. The instantiation view makes the emphasis on 
monotheism inexplicable. As such, I take the instantiation view to be inconsistent 
with the emphasis on monotheism found in Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
  
3.3. Other Answers? 
 
I conclude that more work needs to be done on what exactly the relation is between 
the divine persons and the divine nature. The relation cannot be one that requires 
either (i) transitivity and symmetry or (ii) obeys Leibniz’s Law. Such a view collapses 
the three down to one, and thus is inconsistent with Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
Likewise, the relationship cannot be that of mere instantiation. Such a view runs 
afoul of monotheism and thus is inconsistent with Conciliar Trinitarianism. We need 
something in between, so to speak.  
Historically, various conceptualizations of the relation in question have been 
offered. Some have argued that the relationship is one of virtual distinction.22 Others, 
 
22 See, for instance, Ott (1960, 68–75). 
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following Scotus, have argued that it is not virtual distinction but formal 
distinction.23 More recently, the relation has been interpreted as numerical sameness 
without identity.24 One commonality among these views is that they all deny the 
conjunction of symmetry and transitivity of the relation in question. Ott (1960, 75) 
writes, following Aquinas (ST I q.28 a.3 ad.1):  
 
The principle adduced against the dogma of the Trinity: two things which are equal 
to a third are equal among themselves, is valid only when the two things are in every 
respect, re et ratione, equal to a third thing. The Divine Persons and the Divine 
Essence are indeed really identical, but virtually (ratione) different. Thus the Three 
Persons are indeed identical in Essence, but different from one another in their 
relation to one another.  
 
Ott here aims for a sort of real sameness that denies the conjunction of symmetry 
and transitivity. Spelling out that relationship, or more likely, family of potential 
relationships, and considering how it fares in the contemporary analytic discussion, 
would be a great project for someone.  
A second project that one could take up is discerning what it could mean for the 
divine nature to be such that it “truly is the Father and the Son and the holy Spirit, 
the three persons together and each one of them separately” (Tanner 1990, 232). How 
can one thing truly be both a number of things together and each member of that 
number separately?25 Is this a key to unlocking the proper interpretation of the 
relation between the nature and the persons?  
 
4. Do the Divine Processions Imply Ontological Subordination in the Trinity?  
 
Consider now an example of the sort of internal contradiction worry that Conciliar 
Trinitarianism has to face. One general form of objection to any conjunction of 
propositions is to attempt to show that the truth of some subset of those propositions 
entails the falsity of some other member of that conjunction. If one can show that the 
conditional, if P, then not Q, is true, then one has shown that the conjunction, P&Q, 
is false. In In Defense of Conciliar Christology, I called conditionals that take the truth 
of a part of Conciliar Christology as its antecedent and the falsity of another part as 
 
23 For a good discussion of Scotus on trinitarian theology and the formal distinction and abundant 
references to other discussions, see Spencer (2017, 128–29). 
24 See the work of Brower and Rea (2005). For recent arguments against this view, see Leftow 
(2018). 
25 For discussion of this question, see Williams (2019). 
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its consequent Unfriendly Conditionals (Pawl 2016d, 210–15). What are some 
unfriendly conditionals for Conciliar Trinitarianism? 
One unfriendly conditional that is constructible from the discussion of the 
previous section is the following: If there are three divine persons, then it is false that 
there is one God. The Conciliar Trinitarian accepts the antecedent and denies the 
consequent of this conditional, and so denies its truth.  
Another unfriendly conditional comes from consideration of the divine 
processions and the ontological perfection of each divine person. Does the pouring 
forth of the Son or Spirit asserted in the councils render the Son or Spirit somehow 
derivative in his attributes, lesser than the Father? Is the Spirit, on the conciliar 
teaching, powerful or wise through another, or through some sharing in another’s 
power or wisdom? Conciliar Trinitarianism answers this question with a clear “No.” 
Just a few lines after using the language of pouring forth, quoted in Section II, Cyril 
writes: 
 
we do not say that the Spirit is wise and powerful through some sharing with 
another, for he is all perfect and in need of no good thing. Since he is the Spirit of 
the power and wisdom of the Father, that is the Son, he is himself, evidently, 
wisdom and power. (Tanner 1990, 57–58) 
 
Likewise, Chalcedon teaches, the Son is no lower than the Father, though he is born 
of the Father: 
 
[H]e was born God from God, almighty from the Almighty, co–eternal from the 
Eternal, not later in time, not lower in power, not unlike in glory, not distinct in 
being. (Tanner 1990, 77) 
 
We see, then, that, according to Conciliar Trinitarianism, the processions of the 
Second and Third Persons do not imply an ontological inferiority of those persons 
to the Father. 
Some have argued that one part of Conciliar Trinitarianism—the processions—
implies the falsity of another part of Conciliar Trinitarianism—the ontological parity 
of the divine persons. As such, some have argued for a conditional unfriendly to 
Conciliar Trinitarianism. Call that claim—that the processions imply a denial of 
ontological parity—The Procession Conditional, or just The Conditional for short.  
If The Conditional were true, then Conciliar Trinitarianism would be false. For 
Conciliar Trinitarianism says that there are personal processions in the Trinity (PP) 
and there is ontological parity (OP) among the persons of the Trinity. And the 
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Conditional says that if PP is true, then OP is false. Those three claims are 
inconsistent: any two of them imply the falsehood of the third. So, if The Conditional 
were true, then at least one of the remaining claims is false. But, if one of the 
remaining claims is false, then any conjunction that includes that claim is false. 
Conciliar Trinitarianism is one such conjunction. So, if The Conditional is true, then 
(by hypothetical syllogism) Conciliar Trinitarianism is false. What the proponent of 
Conciliar Trinitarianism must do, then, is deny the truth of The Conditional. To do 
so, the proponent of Conciliar Trinitarianism should investigate the arguments of 
the proponents of The Conditional. What are those arguments? 
We find one in a recent publication by William Lane Craig. Craig writes:  
 
This doctrine of the generation of the Logos from the Father cannot, despite 
assurances to the contrary, but diminish the status of the Son because He becomes 
an effect contingent upon the Father. Even if this eternal procession takes place 
necessarily and apart from the Father’s will, the Son is less than the Father because 
the Father alone exists a se, whereas the Son exists through another (ab alio). (Craig 
2019, 27) 
 
The reasoning for The Conditional can be presented as follows. If, as Conciliar 
Trinitarianism says, the Son proceeds from the Father, then the Father but not the 
Son is a se. If the Father but not the Son is a se, then there is not ontological parity 
between the Father and the Son. Thus, (by Hypothetical Syllogism) if the Son 
proceeds from the Father, then there is not ontological parity between the Father and 
the Son. Similar argumentation can show that there is a lack of ontological parity 
between the Father and the Holy Spirit. Thus, The Conditional is true.  
Ryan Mullins offers another recent argument for the truth of The Conditional, 
along similar lines. Mullins (2017, 195–98) claims that anything that is God is a se and 
self–sufficient. As he defines the terms, 
 
 A being exists a se if and only if its existence is not dependent upon, nor derived 
from, anything outside of itself …  
A being is self–sufficient if and only if its essential nature is in no way dependent 
upon, nor derived from, anything outside of itself. (Mullins 2017, 196)  
 
Were the Son and Spirit to proceed from the Father, as Conciliar Trinitarianism 
requires, then they would both lack aseity and self–sufficiency. So, neither would be 
divine. Since not divine, they would not have ontological parity with the Father, 
who is divine. Thus, if the Son and Spirit proceed, they lack ontological parity. In 
other words, The Conditional is true.  
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How ought a Conciliar Trinitarian respond to Craig’s and Mullin’s arguments? 
Craig suggests that Christians ought to understand the processional language as 
processions in the economic trinity, not as internal to the divine life. The Word is 
begotten from the Father in time as a man, but this begetting does not carry over into 
the internal relations within the Trinity. As Craig writes,  
 
it may well be arbitrary which person plays the role of “Father” and which of “Son.” 
These titles have reference to the economic Trinity, to the roles played by the three 
persons in the plan of salvation with respect to the created order. The Son is 
whichever person becomes incarnate, the Spirit is he who stands in the place of and 
continues the ministry of the Son, and the Father is the one who sends the Son and 
Spirit. (Craig 2019, 30) 
 
Understood in this way, we can still make sense of the processional language of 
scripture without committing ourselves to processions internal to the divine life. As 
such, for Craig, we could avoid his worries about the Son and Spirit being inferior 
to the Father.  
Such a response is not open to the Conciliar Trinitarian. As Craig (2019, 29) notes, 
“Nicene Orthodoxy” requires processions internal to the Trinity, and not merely a 
begetting in time. For the Son is claimed in the Nicene–Constantinopolitan Creed to 
be “begotten from the Father before all the ages” (Tanner 1990, 5). And even if there 
were a way to understand this claim such that it didn’t imply an internal procession 
of Son from Father, other conciliar texts preclude such a reading. See, for instance, 
the 2nd Anathema of 2nd Constantinople, which says:  
 
If anyone will not confess that the Word of God has two nativities, that which is 
before all ages from the Father, outside time and without a body, and secondly that 
nativity of these latter days when the Word of God came down from the heavens 
and was made flesh of holy and glorious Mary, mother of God and ever–virgin, and 
was born from her: let him be anathema. (Tanner 1990, 114) 
 
Here the word translated “nativities” (gennēseis; nativitates) is the same word we find 
in the earlier creeds for begetting. The councils teach that the Son has two begettings, 
one from the Father outside of time (achronōs; sine tempore), the other in time from 
the holy and glorious ever–virgin Mary. As such, the Conciliar Trinitarian is not free 
to jettison the eternal generation of the Son.  
What ought the Conciliar Trinitarian do? Here I will develop one response 
modeled on my work on Conciliar Christology. The councils predicate apparently 
incompatible predicates of the one God–man, Jesus Christ. He is, for instance, both 
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passible and impassible.26 We find such claims in the fathers and Medievals, too. For 
just a small sampling, Athanasius, John of Damascus, and Thomas Aquinas all 
predicate both passibility and impassibility to Jesus Christ.27 How can we 
understand these attributes such that this isn’t a blatant contradiction?  
I have argued for a solution to this problem that revises our understandings of 
the truth conditions for these allegedly contradictory pairs of predicates.28 I think the 
best response for the Conciliar Christologist is to defend truth conditions for the 
predicates that have the following form: the predicate, “passible,” is apt of a thing if 
and only if it has a concrete nature that is able to be causally affected. Likewise, the 
predicate, “impassible,” is apt of a thing if and only if it has a concrete nature that is 
unable to be causally affected.29 Since Christ has a divine nature that, as we’ve seen, 
is unable to be causally affected, given the teaching of the ecumenical councils, he 
fulfills the conditions for being impassible. Since he has a human nature that can be 
causally affected—can be hung on a cross—he fulfills the conditions for being 
passible. He is both at the same time without a contradiction. I have argued that we 
can understand “immutable” and “mutable,” “atemporal” and “temporal,” and 
“simple” and “complex” in the same revised manner.30 Such an understanding of 
the truth conditions for these predicates is not a novelty; we find it at least as far 
back as the work of Gabriel Biel (died 1495).31 
So likewise, we can understand aseity. Here we won’t be able to appeal to 
multiple natures, as the Holy Spirit only has the one divine nature. But we can 
maintain the has a nature that method of providing truth conditions for the divine 
predicates. Such a method yields beneficial results for the Conciliar Trinitarian here, 
just as it does in Conciliar Christology.  
Rather than something being a se when, as Mullins puts it, “its existence is not 
dependent upon, nor derived from, anything outside of itself,” something is a se 
when it has a nature the existence of which is not dependent upon, nor derived from, 
 
26 See Tanner 1990, 162.  For discussions of examples, see Pawl (2014; 2015; 2016d; 2016b; 2018; 
2019b; 2020a; Forthcoming). 
27 For Athanasius, see Anatolios (2004, 70); for Damascus, see De Fide Orth. iii, 4; for Aquinas, see 
ST III q.16 a.12 ad.2. 
28 See Pawl (2014; 2016d, chap. 7). 
29 This is not to say that all predicates have the same form.  They do not.  Predication is a gruesome 
affair, and one can always coin new predicates with stipulated truth conditions to frustrate any 
helpful, illuminating theory of how predicates must function. For more on this, see Pawl (2016d, 135–
36; 2020b, sec. 3). 
30 See Pawl (2016d, chap. 8; 2018; Forthcoming). 
31 See Pawl (2019a, 442–44).  I thank Richard Cross for referring me to the Biel text. 
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anything outside of itself. Then, since each divine person has a nature that is not 
dependent or derived, each divine person is a se.  
We can see how this revised understanding of the conditions for aseity allows the 
Conciliar Trinitarian to deny a premise of both Craig’s and Mullins’s arguments. As 
I presented it, Craig required the premise “if, as Conciliar Trinitarianism says, the 
Son proceeds from the Father, then the Father but not the Son is a se.” This, though, 
turns out to be false. For the Son is a se on the revised truth conditions. Thus, the 
Conciliar Trinitarian will say that the antecedent of that conditional premise is true, 
but the second conjunct of the consequent (i.e., the claim that the Son is not a se) is 
false on the right understanding of aseity, so the whole conditional is false.  
Likewise, Mullin’s premise (as I represent the argument) “were the Son and Spirit 
to proceed from the Father, as Conciliar Trinitarianism requires, then they would 
both lack aseity and self–sufficiency” would be false. For each divine person has a 
nature that fulfills the conditions needful for that person to be properly called “a se.” 
And each has an essential nature—the one divine nature—that is not dependent on 
or derived from anything outside that nature. So, each is self–sufficient, too.  
We see, then, that the Conciliar Trinitarian has at least one method open for 
answering these challenges. This method does not require inventing a new method 
of understanding divine predicates out of whole cloth. We find it at least 500 years 
ago in Christological writings.  
Suppose the objection is put a bit differently.32 The Spirit depends on another 
because the Father spirates the Spirit. But the Spirit is independent because the Spirit 
is God and anything that is God is independent. So, it seems the Spirit is both 
dependent and independent, which is contradictory. Thus, the conjunction of 
procession and divinity seems impossible after all. The Conditional is vindicated! 
Notice that my preferred strategy of adding a has a concrete nature clause to the 
ontological conditions under which the relevant predicates—independent and 
dependent—are satisfied will not work here. Such a response requires saying that to 
be independent is to have a concrete nature that fulfills certain conditions and to be 
dependent is to have a nature that does not fulfill those conditions. As I noted a few 
paragraphs above, the Spirit, unlike the Son, only has one nature; thus, the Spirit 
can’t be both independent and dependent in that manner. What to do?  
First, note that the Conditional is vindicated here only if “independent” and 
“dependent” are defined in contradictory ways, such that we must predicate one 
thing of the Spirit in virtue of being spirated and deny that very same thing of him 
in virtue of being divine. How are the terms defined? It is of no help here to say that 
 
32 I owe this objection, and much of its wording, to Joseph Jedwab. 
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being dependent means being dependent, darn it, and being independent means being 
independent, and those are contradictory! For we already have a recipe for 
understanding the definitions of the terms such that they are not contradictory—
adding the has a concrete nature clause. On such a definition, the Spirit is independent 
and is not dependent, since the Spirit (1) has a nature that is independent of all else 
and (2) has no nature that is dependent on another thing. Similarly, in my previous 
responses to the arguments of Mullins and Craig I’ve proposed that the Spirit is a se 
and not not a se. I said that because of how I defined the term aseity; the Spirit has a 
nature that depends on nothing for its existence, but has no nature that depends on 
something for its existence.  
But suppose that the objector refuses to countenance my definition.  
 
You know what dependence means, you scoundrel! And even if you don’t have a 
good, single understanding of it—Fine. Take every way you’ve ever thought that 
something depends on something else—nothing that is God can depend in any of 
those ways, no matter what, period. That’s independence. That’s what intuitions 
supported by perfect being theology require. But procession is a form, some form, 
of dependence. So, again, leaving your chicanery with predicates to one side, we see 
the vindication of The Conditional.33  
 
In response, let the objector have the term. Understand independence as she 
suggests. I still think that there is a good response, based on how the Christian must 
understand other predicates put forward by perfect being theology. Consider, for 
instance, immutability. Perfect being theologians might feel inclined to suggest that 
we take every way you’ve ever thought about something changing—nothing that is 
God can change in any of those ways, no matter what, period. That’s immutability.34 
Or likewise, nothing that is God can be composite in any of those ways, no matter 
what, period, or be causally affected in any of those ways, or be effable in any of those 
ways,35 no matter what, period. The truth is, Christian doctrine is inconsistent with 
all of those claims. Something that is God can change, can suffer, can be composed 
of body and soul, flesh and blood, can be understood, at least understood as being a 
man, etc. The doctrine of the Incarnation requires as much. None of these “no matter 
what, period” versions of the divine attributes have ever been consistent with 
Christianity. It is no surprise that other overly strong versions of the divine 
attributes—aseity, no matter what, period; independence, no matter what, period—
 
33 The wording of this speech is not due to Joseph; he’s too nice to call me a scoundrel.   
34 Elsewhere (Pawl 2018, 920) I called this “super–duper immutability.” 
35 Elsewhere (Pawl 2020b) I called this “the ridiculously strong doctrine of divine ineffability.”  
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face a similar fate. So if we let the objector have the term “independent” as 
understood in this strong, no matter what, period, sense of the term, then I accept 
that the Spirit is dependent and not independent in that particular sense. I also deny 
that anything that is God must be independent in that sense, just as I deny, for 
incarnational reasons, that anything that is God must be immutable no matter what, 
period, or impassible no matter what, period, or… 
As a final foray down this dialectic, what if the objector retorts that drawing on 
the incarnation is not relevant here. For all the examples I could give of “no matter 
what, period” immutability or impassibility or simplicity or ineffability or 
independence being violated are incarnational examples. And the Spirit is not 
incarnate! Yes, qua human, the Son can change. But qua divine, the Son is, for the 
perfect being theologian, immutable, impassible, simple, ineffable, and independent 
in the “no matter what, period” sense of the terms. The Spirit, then, must be likewise. 
What now? 
Here I fear we’ve come full circle to my initial has a nature that understandings of 
the predicates, and it is the opponent who has led us here. When the objector says 
that the Son or Spirit is, qua divine, immutable or impassible or simple or ineffable or 
independent, what does that amount to? What does the “qua” locution do for the 
claim? On the view I think is best, the “qua” functions as an ontological laser pointer, 
pointing to the ontological principle in virtue of which the predication is true. Here, 
the Spirit is independent because of the divine nature, that is, because the concrete 
nature is a certain way—namely, the way I provided in my account of aseity above. 
And, on my same preferred account, as I said above, the Spirit is not “dependent” 
in a sense that is contradictory to this independence.  
If the opponent denies my preferred account of the “qua,” she still needs an 
account of “qua.” Heaven help her if, after all this digression, the because of in the 
“qua” includes any dependence at all. For instance, if the Spirit is worshipful because 
the Spirit is divine (that is, has the divine nature). For that’s some sort of dependence. 
Whence the independence, no matter what, period, if the Spirit’s worshipfulness 
depends upon his divinity?  
Moreover, it is a common, traditional view that each divine person could have 
become incarnate, even though only the Son in fact did.36 But then, it is possible that 
the Father or Spirit be causally affected. For it is possible that they become incarnate, 
and, necessarily, if incarnate, then causally affected. The same is true for other 
attributes. The upshot, then, is that if the other persons could become incarnate, the 
 
36 For discussion of multiple incarnations and references to other literature on the topic, see Pawl 
(2016a; 2016c; 2019b, chaps. 2 & 3). 
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“no matter what, period” attributes I’ve been discussing are not satisfied by any of 
the divine persons. The Spirit could be dependent as an unborn child is on her 
mother. So the Spirit’s divinity does not require that the Spirit must not be 
dependent in every sense of “dependent.” Being independent, no matter what, 
period, is not an attribute that divinity requires.  
To summarize: Do the divine processions imply the ontological inferiority of the 
Son and Spirit, as the Procession Conditional claims? Craig and Mullins argue for 
the truth of the Procession Conditional by means of aseity and independence. Only 
the Father is a se or independent, and so the Son and Spirit, given the doctrine of 
divine procession, are inferior to the Father. What to make of this reasoning? It all 
depends upon what we mean by “aseity” and “independence.”  
When understood in my preferred senses of the terms, “aseity” and 
“independence” require only that the thing have a nature that doesn’t depend on 
something else. The Holy Spirit has aseity and independence in that sense. Since the 
Holy Spirit only has one nature, the divine nature, the Holy Spirit lacks dependence, 
where “dependence” is understood to be the contradictory of “independence.” 
Lacking this sort of dependence is not inconsistent with depending on the Father in 
other senses of the term.  
Suppose the opponent denies this last claim, asserting that aseity, when properly 
understood, requires that the thing that is a se not depend on anything else in any 
sense of the term “depend.” If the opponent refuses to countenance the conditions 
for the satisfaction of these predicates that I offer, but instead relies on a(n overly) 
strong notion of the divine attributes, which I’ve here called “no matter what, 
period” attributes, then the Christian should say that those attributes are not 
required for divinity. One piece of evidence that they are not required for being 
divine comes from reflection on the incarnation.  
In either case, then, whether we understand “aseity” in my sense, or in the “no 
matter what, period” sense, the antecedent of the conditional does not imply its 
consequent. In my sense of the term, it is true that the Spirit is a se, but that doesn’t 
imply inferiority. In the opponent’s sense, it is false that any of the divine persons 
are a se, and so their having aseity could not imply their inferiority. In either case, 
then, The Conditional is false.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In this article, I have presented the teachings of Conciliar Trinitarianism—the 
trinitarian teachings of the first seven ecumenical councils. I then discussed two 
questions that arise in light of those teachings. First, a question I called the Person–
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Nature question: How are the divine persons related to the divine nature? Second, 
a question about the internal consistency of Conciliar Trinitarianism: Does divine 
procession imply ontological subordination among the divine persons? To the first, 
I argued that Conciliar Trinitarianism precludes certain answers, but doesn’t, itself, 
require a specific answer. To the second, I provided one means the Conciliar 
Trinitarian might use to deny the unfriendly conditional that procession implies 
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